





































































































The Development of Self and Perspective -Taking: 
A Relational Frame Analysis 
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and 
Paul M. Smeets 
Leiden University, Holland 
From Q relational frame perspective, a child learns 10 dis­
criminate her own behavior and Ihe behavior 0/ others 
through a history of exemplar training in orbilrorlly appli­
cable relational feJponding. The current paper argues Ihal 
the emergence of deie/ie relations such as "/ and you", 
"here and there", and "now and then" is cfiliea/to the deve­
lopment 0/ perspective-laking. The paper also suggests thai 
InJuwior analysis may have an important contribution /0 
make /0 the study of perspeclive-Iolcing. and may prOVide a 
/uncliona/-analytlc aceoum a/what Is sometimes referred /0 
as "theory 0/ mind. " 
The Traditional Behavioral Approach to Self 
Contrary to popular belief, behavior analysis emphasizes the 
imponanl role played by self�knowledge in complex human 
behavior, particularly social and verbal behavior (Dymond 
.t Barnes, 1997). According 10 Skinner (t974), sclf­
awareness or self�iscrimination is shaped through verbal 
interaclio� with others thereby allowing for greater predic� 
lion and inOuence ave; an individual's own behavior. It is 
only when a person's �rivate world �omes im�t to 
others that it becomes Imponant to him. By askmg ques· 
tions such as "How are you feeling", for example, other 
members of the verbal community are, in effect, shaping an 
individual's ability to respond discriminatively tow� 
hislher own behavior. The person is "made aware of him· 
self" by such questions and is thus in a better position to 
predict and control his own behavior (Skinner, 1974, p. 31). 
Skinner, therefore, accounted for the devel?pment .of human self·awareness in lerms of complex SOCial contm­
gencies. One prominent research stra�e� that emerged 
from this interpretation involved determining whether self­
discrimination was a uniquely human phenomenon, or 
whether non-humans could also discriminate their own be­
havior. A number of studies have answered this question by 
demonstrating that the behavior of pigeons, for example, 
may be brought under the control of the �igeons' own p�e� 
vious response patterns (lanai, 1975; Phskoff &
. 
Goldla� 
mond 1966' Reynolds, 1966: Reynotds & Calanla, 1962: 
and Shimp, i982). Although such finding have provided 
42 
suppon for Skinner's interpretation of self-aw8!en�ss., ot�er behavioral researchers have argued that self�lscr1mlnatlon 
cannot be accounted for entirely with the traditional concept 
of discriminative control. More specifically, the modem 
behavior-analytic approach to human language and cogni� 
tion, known as Relational Frame Theory (RFT), suggests 
that human self-<1iscrimination may involve verbal proces­
ses that distinguish it functionally from the nonverbal self� 
discrimination observed with nonhumans. 
A Modern Behavioral Approach to Self 
According to RFT, bidirectionality, derived stimulus rela� 
tions, and the transformation of stimulus functions are core 
processes of verbal behavior (see Hayes, Bames-Holmes, & 
Roche,2ool). From this perspective, a stimulus or response 
is defined as verbal when it participates in an equivalence or 
other type of derived relation, involving these three proper­
ties. This definition of verbal behavior is critical to the RFT 
account of human self-<1iscrimination. 
A sludy reported by Dymond and Barnes (1994) provi­
des a very basic example. Adult humans were first tral.ned and tested for the formation of three, three-member eqUIva­
lence classes (i.e., AI-BtoCl, A2-B2-C2, A3-B3o(3), and 
were then trained to emit two self-discrimination responses 
on two time-based schedules of reinforcement. If subjects 
did not emit a response, choosing one stimulus (81) was 
reinforced, and if they did emit one or more r�sponses c�ocr 
sing another stimulus (B2) was reinforced. Finally, subjects 
were tested for a transfer of these self-discrimination res­
ponse functions in accordance with equivalence relations 
(i,e. , no response· choose C I, and one or more respons�s '"' 
choose e2). All four subjects demonstrate� the .denve.d transfer of self-<1iscrimination response functions via equI­
valence relations. 
Subsequent studies oemonstrated similar effects in ac­
cordance with the relational frames of more�lhanlless-than 
and opposite (Dymond & Barnes, I 995; 1996). These studies 
point to an essential aspect of self-knowledge from an RFT 
perspective (Dymond & Bames, 1997). 






































































































The RFf view of human self·awareness is that the per· 
son is "not simply behaving with regard to his behavior, but 
is also behaving \lerbally with regard to his behavior" 
(Hayes & Wilson, 1993, p. 297 [emphasis added]). A non­
human, when it has leamed to respond to responding, is 
merely perfonning a discrimination in which the original 
response (e.g., peeking according to a ORO or ORL schedu­
le) was discriminative for the second response (e.g., choo­
sing between red and green keys; see Hineline & Wanchi· 
sen, 1989). The derived self.·discrimination performance 
shown by Dymond and Bames (1994) is nOl or that kind. 
Rather it is an instance of \lerbally discriminating one's own 
behavior, because the performances necessarily involved the 
three defining propenies of relational framing. The difTe­
rence between verbal and nonverbal self-knowledge thus 
becomes a functional one. 
A Modern Behavioral Approach to Perspective 
Taking 
In suggesting this clear functional distinction between ver­
bal and nonverbal self-discrimination we have only scrat­
ched the surface. A more complete RFI analysis of self 
requires that we consider perspective-taking frames that 
appear to be essential in the verbal construction of self. In 
the language of RFT, deictic relations, that specify a relation 
in terms of the perspective of the speaker, are a family of 
relational frames that appear to be critical for the develop­
ment of perspective-taking skills. The three frames that 
appear to be most imponant in this regard are the frames of 
I and YOU, HERE and THERE, and NOW and THEN. 
Unlike other relational frames, these do not appear to have 
formal or nOnarbitrary counterpans, and cannot be traced 10 
formal dimensions in the environment. It is the relationship 
between the individual and other events that serves as the 
constant variable upon which these frames are based. Res­
ponding to, and asking, many questions contained within 
our common verbal interactions with others (e.g., "What am 
I doing now ?"or "What are you doing there 1") appear to be 
critical in establishing these perspective-taking frames. 
Each time questions such as these are asked or an­
swered, the physical environment is different. What re­
mains constant across these and many similar questions, 
however. are the relational propenies oft versus You, Here 
versus There, and Now versus Then. FW1hermore, accord­
ing to RFT, these propenies themselves are abstracted 
through leaming to talk abou: one's own perspective in rela­
tion to the perspective of others. I, for instance, is always 
from this perspective here, but not from the perspective of 
another person there. Abstraction of an individual's per­
spective on the world, and that of others, requires a combi­
nation of a sufficiently well developed relational repenoire 
and an extensive history of exemplars that take advantage of 
that repenoire. 
According to RFT, the three perspective-taking frames 
described above can generate a range of relational networks, 
including: I-HERE-NOW; YOU-HERE-NOW; I-HERE­
THEN; YOU-HERE-THEN; I-THERE-NOW; YOU-
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THERE-NOW; I-THERE-THEN; and YOU-1HERE­
THEN. Many phrties common to our daily discourse ore 
derived from these eight relational networks. Consider. for 
example, the phrases; "I am here now, but you were here 
then"; "You were there then, but I am here now"; and "You 
and I are both here now, but I was here then". Of COl rse, 
when used in actual dialog, these phrases would often in­
clude or substitute words coordinated with panicular indi­
viduals, places, and times. For illustrative purposes, con­
sider the following, "It is six o'clock and I am at work 
[HERE and NOW], but Mary [YOU] is still at home" 
[THERE and NOW]. What makes perspeclive-<aking 
frames particularly complex and useful is that they cannot 
be defined in tenns of particular words, even the words, "I". 
"you", "here", "there", "now", and "then". Accordin1 to 
RFT, words such as these (used to describe the perspective 
of the self and others) are merely examples of the relational 
cues that control the perspective-taking frames, and a range 
of other words and contextual features may serve the same 
function. As is the case for all relational frames. whllt is 
important is the generalized relational activity, not the ,,-tual 
words themselves. 
Pusp.cli.e-Taking and Theory of Mind 
The RFT approach to perspective-taking is relatively I�W, 
but there are more established approaches in mainSlleanl 
psychology. In the latter half of this article. we will use 
RFT to provide a behavioral interpretation of perhaps the 
most prominent theory of perspective-taking currently found 
in the psychological literature. 
Although this constitutes a purely interpretive exercise, 
it is our hope that it will also serve 10 stimulate relevant em­
pirical research within the behavioral tradition. 
Perspective-taking has traditionally been interpreted 
within the broader context of 'Theory of Mind' (Baron­
Cohen, Tager-Flusherg, & Cohen, 2000). According to a 
typical approach in this area, there are five levels in the de­
velopment of knowledge about infonnational states of the 
selr and others (Howl in, Baron-Cohen, & Hadwin, 1999). 
We will now look brieOy at the cognitive or perspective· 
taking tasks traditionally addressed within each of these 
levels. 
Level I involves simple visual perspective-taking, and is 
based on the principle that different people can see different 
things. For example, if a two-sided card is held up between 
two people, each individual can see only what is on one 
side. Level 2 involves complex visual perspective-taking, 
and is based on the principle that people can see things dif­
ferently. For example, two individuals seated opposite one 
another across a table will have different perspectives on the 
same picture placed between them. One will see the picture 
the right way uP. whereas to the other individual. the picture 
will appear upside down. Tasks such as these are often 
conducted as pan of training programs for establishing or 
facilitating theory of mind skills in young children, such as 
those diagnosed as autistic (Reed Ii Peterson,I990). Ac­







































































































trol of the relational frame of I-YOU, in that correct re­
sponses to questions such as "What can you/J see?" are de­
termined by the cues "I" and "you," which are contained in 
the tasks. 
Level 3 of the traditional theory of mind approach to 
perspective-taking is 'seeing leads to knowing', and is based 
on the principle that people only know things that they have 
seen (Taylor, 1988). In one such task, an object is placed 
insidl' a box when a child has his or her eyes closed. and the 
child is then asked "What is inside the box?" A verbally 
sophisticated child is likely to admit that slhe cannot know 
because slhe did not see. If the child is then allowed to see 
inside the box, and is asked "Now, how do you know what 
is inside the box?" slhe is likely to correctly reply "I saw 
what was inside". The basic correct conclusions in this sce­
nario are "I know because 1 have seen, and I do not know 
when' have not seen". A similar scenario is then presented 
to the child in order to demonstrate the perspective of anot­
her (e.g., a doll), and the same questions are posed with re­
gard to the doll's perspective. In the language of RFT, trai­
ning of this kind increases the contextual control of I-YOU 
and indirectly establishes control by the relational frame of 
NOV/-THEN. Consider these relational frames in the co-. 
rrect answers to the above scenario: "I didn't see THEN SO I 
don� know NOW" and "YOU saw THEN SO YOU know 
NOW". 
Level 4 of this traditional model of perspeclive.taking 
involves the principle that you can predict actions on the 
basis of knowledge (Le., true belief). Consider a traditional 
training task inVOlving toys, in which two similar scenes are 
portrayed. In one scene, a car is placed beside a boat, and in 
the other scene, an idenlical car is placed beside a plane. A 
child is then provided with the following true belief story. 
"This morning, you saw the car next to the boat but you did 
not see the car next to the plane". The child is then asked, 
"Whf'fe do you think the car is? Why do you think it is near 
the b'lSt? Where will you go to get the car? Why will you 
go 10 !.he boat?" The correct conclusions from this scenario 
involve the knowledge that one will only know what one 
has seen, and will acl on this basis. According to RFT, con­
textual control of the relational frames of '-YOU, HERE­
TIlERE, and NOW-THEN is being established at this level 
(although again Ihe frames have not been targeted directly). 
Consider the role of the relational frames in the correct ans­
wer as follows: "I saw the car next 10 the boat (lliERE) this 
momina (TIlEN) and so I think the car is THERE NOW". 
Level S of this model involves the principle that you can 
predict actions on the basis of false belief. In traditional 
training tasks, this level might be established as follows. A 
child is shown a biscuit tin. for example, and asked, "What 
do you think is inside Ihe tin?" Unbeknownst to the child, 
the biscuit tin does not contlin biscuits, but does in fact con­
tain a toy. The child is then shown inside the lin, and asked, 
"Before we opened the tin. what did you think was inside? 
And what is really inside?" A similar scenario is then pre­
sented from the perspective of another (e.g., a doll), and the 
same questions are presenled with regard to this alternative 
perspective. In the language of RFT, these tasks indirectly 
establish contextual control of the three perspective-taking 
frames 1-YOU, HERE-THERE, and NOW-THEN (these 
tasks also add relational flexibility by requiring control by 
the relational frame of logical. 
Consider the relational frames in the correct answer as 
follows: "I did NOT see inside THERE and THEN, but I do 
see inside HERE and NOW." 
In outlining the traditional approach to perspective­
taking, we suggested that the tasks commonly used to esta­
blish theory of mind indirectly involve training in relational 
perspective-taking (i.e., I-YOU, HERE-THERE, and NOW­
llIEN). According to RFT, however, a more effective 
means of establishing these repenoires would be to target 
the relational frames directly, thereby focusing the training 
on the largely verbal nature of the behavior involved. In 
I ine with the current thesis, we are developing RfT -based 
training and testing lasks that might be used to establish and 
analyze perspective-taking. The research also aims to de­
monstrate that perspective-taking might be usefully conside­
red a form of generalized relational operant behavior. In 
shon, our goal is to lay the procedural and empirical 
groundwork for further RFT analyses of perspeclive-taking 
behaviors in young children. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the current thesis is clearly driven by a modem 
behavioral approach to perspective-tlking, it may be of $0-
rne interest to non-behavioral psychologists. For example, 
Benson (2001), a cultural psychologist, has argued recently 
that I very imponant aspect of the development of a sense 
of self is the verbal location of oneself in a time and place 
relative to others. In a sense, therefore, perhaps behavioral 
psychology and cultural psychology are closing in on a 
treatment of self that is similar in function, if not in fonn. 
That is, both psychologies see the "selr' as largely verbally 
constructed, but adopt different approaches to the study and 
definition of what it means to verbally comlrucl oneself. 
Indeed, the fact that two different psychological traditions 
are drawing similar conclusions would seem to suggest that 
the current approach to perspective-taking may well have 
significant value. 
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